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On the Codification of International Law1
On 13 March 1930, the first conference on the codification of international 
law will convene in The Hague. In the first Place, is this a feasible task 
and, if so, can it be performed in our times? If it is possible, then in what 
scope and using what method?
The word “codification”, through the most immediate association, 
brings to mind the idea of a code, which is to say, a statute that system-
atically and exhaustively regulates some large segment of community 
life; it is used to refer to a uniform statute, relying on a single conception, 
subordinated to a single guiding idea and, finally, free from loopholes 
and internal contradictions. France boasts eight codes, the most illustri-
ous being the Napoleonic Civil Code of 1804, which encompassed this 
huge domain of human relations in 2,281 articles; the Austrian Civil 
Code of 1811 managed to subsume this domain in as few as 1,502 arti-
cles. Only one hundred years later—we ignore here Italian, Spanish and 
Portuguese codes—one can mention other monuments of legislation 
which equal the previous ones in importance: the German Civil Code, 
in force since 1 January 1900, the Swiss Code that came into force as of 
1 January 1912 and, finally, the last one, which will be counted among 
1 Translated from: B Winiarski, O kodyfikacji prawa międzynarodowego, “Ruch Prawniczy, 
Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny” 1930, 1, pp. 144–159 by Tomasz Żebrowski and proof-
read by Stephen Dersley and Ryszard Reisner. The translation and proofreading were fi-
nanced by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education under 848/2/P-DUN/2018.
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the greatest: Codex iuris canonici of 1917, encompassing the entire le-
gal life of the Church in 2,214 canons. 
If those codification enterprises succeeded, it was first of all possible 
because the legal norms that were to be included in the codes had reached 
a high degree of perfection. For thousands of years, millions and millions 
of events, and human relations had been regulated by norms, which for 
this very reason were able to attain a high degree of generality. How many 
sale and purchase transactions were needed, and in what diverse condi-
tions, involving a great variety of objects and transacting parties (e.g. from 
buying a wife, serfs, or an office, etc. to securities, an insurance policy or 
a lottery ticket), to be able to capture the entire institution of sale-purchase 
in a few sections of a civil statute! For thousands of years, they had been 
worked on by creative juristic minds. Customary law was written down, 
systematised, supplemented and amended by way of legislation until the 
norms became so certain and the institutions had crystallised to such an 
extent that codification was only a natural crowning of the work of centu-
ries. It can be said that the Napoleonic Code had existed in all its details, 
before it was drafted. How then, did the Code of Canon Law arise? Pope 
Pius X commanded ut universae Ecclesiae leges, ad haec usque tempora 
editae,  lucido ordine digestae,  in unum colligerentur, amotis  inde quae 
abrogatae essent aut obsoletae, aliis, ubi opus fuisset, ad nostrorum tem-
porum conditionem propius aptatis.
The mainspring of all codification enterprises is almost always 
a powerful extra-legal factor: aspirations for greater political unity. The 
Napoleonic Code is an affirmation of a new France, which emerges 
from the revolutionary turmoil as not only “one and indivisible”, but 
also strongly centralised. The Austrian Code was meant to reinforce 
the Habsburg monarchy, which was held together as a patchwork. The 
German Civil Code, in turn, capped the unification of Germany. It is 
for this very reason that the Congress Kingdom of Poland instinctively 
defended its civil code as a sign of its separate identity vis-à-vis Rus-
sia, and the Poles now yearn for a Polish civil code for the same rea-
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son, since it will not only crown the process of national unification, but 
also serve as a powerful unifying factor and the surest safeguard of unity 
for the future. 
International law, the body of legal norms regulating relations be-
tween states, is an entirely different matter. The number of states who 
are its subjects is very limited indeed; it now stands at only about three 
score. Relations between them, despite the huge development of in-
ternational communications, economic and cultural exchange, and de-
spite their ever-closer interdependence on each other, are far less in-
tensive than between individuals. Moreover, not all these relations are 
governed by international law: vast domains are found outside its limits. 
They belong to internal matters and as such are exclusively subject to 
domestic jurisdiction. The number of facts regulated by international 
law is relatively small; these are events and relations of a very diverse 
character and not recurrent. The abstracting mind of a jurist has not 
extracted enough elements from them yet that would allow him to re-
duce the body of international law norms to a number of institutions 
arranged in a logical system. 
These norms are distinguished by a low degree of generality, they 
are very specific and detailed, and bear clear signs of the circumstances 
to which they have been adapted; the international law systematics in 
question is still in its infancy. 
It is to custom that we owe the most ancient and consolidated and 
the most broadly adopted norms of international law. If they share all the 
advantages of customary law, however, they share its disadvantages as 
well, such as uncertainty if a rule has already become a binding norm 
and to what extent, or if it already has perchance ceased to be one, not to 
mention the inconsistency of norm construction and application. These 
disadvantages are aggravated by the fact that in international relations 
there is no authority that would resolve doubts and establish norms. Al-
most everything depends on the discretion of states, which are guided by 
not only their national sense of law, but also their national interest. The 
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other source—treaties—admittedly gains in importance, as relations de-
veloping at a hitherto unknown rate demand to be quickly systematised 
legally, while customary law is of no help. Conventional norms, how-
ever, often established under the supremacy or even pressure of a group 
of states, sometimes of a single power, too often bear the mark of a mo-
ment or political circumstances; they jar the sense of law of some soci-
eties, infringe the interests of others and are far from the authority that 
legal norms ought to enjoy. When, however, as it often happens, each 
party, approving some compromise wording of a provision, readied an 
interpretation of its own in advance, then it transpires as soon as the 
agreement comes into force that each party had signed something else: 
instead of one there are actually several treaties. 
Where can an authority be found that could impose uniformity here? 
We should not deplore the absence of such, because it follows from the 
very nature of international law, which is based on recognition—express 
or implied—by states, i.e. the subjects of international law. This is the 
principle that in ancient times in Poland was expressed by the classic 
formula: “nothing on us without us”. Or even more: with the exception 
of few minor cases (e.g. certain resolutions of the League of Nations of 
an organisational character) that must be clearly provided for, the states 
enjoy a clear liberum veto, i.e. they may block resolutions on matters in 
which they are involved. This state of affairs may cause some inconve-
nience and attempts are made to limit this liberum veto at least where 
this is possible: in international organisations. For instance, the charter 
of the International Communications and Transit Organization at the 
League of Nations stipulates that a 2/3 majority of votes of states repre-
sented at a general conference is necessary for the adoption of any draft 
resolution. Hence, a single state may not block the adoption of the text 
of a convention, but the convention, of course, will bind only the states 
that ratify it. It may even happen that the text of a convention will be 
adopted but the convention will not be validated or will not come into 
force due to the insufficient number of ratifications. 
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The principle of “nothing on us without us” is only a natural conse-
quence of state sovereignty and the surest palladium of national liberty, 
but does not—for that matter—make the formulation of international law 
any easier. As a result, it must be said that international law has relatively 
few universally binding norms; many more norms belong to particular 
international law. The latter are recognised by only some groups of coun-
tries. The renowned Italian scholar Anzilotti was right when he wrote that 
“the largest part of international law is made up of particular law”.
Finally, the codification of international law has no powerful stimu-
lus comparable to an aspiration for political unity; quite on the contrary, 
every state adamantly defends its independence that—alongside differ-
ences in the sense of law and different interests—sets limits on the ef-
forts at legal unification in the area of international relations, which are 
quite frequent nowadays. Hence, these international movements and or-
ganisations that have as their objectives the foundation of some kind 
of an European or world federation, a universal “super-state”, see the 
codification of international law as one of the roads towards this objec-
tive. Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that the introduction of such a po-
litical factor to the question of codification should make governments 
extremely cautious and demands the utmost prudence.
Over one hundred years ago, two outstanding German scholars 
clashed over the question of civil law codification. As a matter of fact, 
both the scholars were of French descent and the echoes of this clash 
have reverberated ever since. In 1814—right after the victory over Na-
poleon, when national enthusiasm was at its peak—Thibaut published 
the pamphlet On  the Necessity  of  a General Civil Law  for Germany. 
A barbarian patchwork of Germanic laws, Church law and Roman law 
was no longer fitting for a victorious nation; a single model act was 
necessary, one independent of the will of the governments of particular 
German states, and unifying all Germans in a sense of brotherhood. It is 
not only a patriotic tendency that is discernible in this approach, but also 
a large dose of rationality and an exaggerated cult of the Statute famil-
264 | Bohdan Winiarski
iar to us from the French Revolution. A similarly patriotic response to 
Thibaut’s views was provided by Friedrich Carl von Savigny. The lat-
ter, if not the most profound then the most celebrated representative 
of the young historical school in jurisprudence, published his views in 
the pamphlet Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebungund Rechtswis-
senschaft (1814). The national genius creates law in the same way as it 
produces language, custom, poetry and entire folk art. It is customary 
law that is always alive, perfectly suits society’s sense of law and there-
fore is the best. Admittedly, there must come a time when people’s direct 
legal creativity is no longer possible, and this is when learned jurists 
come into play. However, the role of the legal profession is rather what 
we would call today legal technique. The sources of law still spring from 
the depths of national genius. A statute does not create law, but rather 
formulates law that is alive in society’s sense of law or even in its aware-
ness of law. A code should be a perfect expression of this law, hence it 
ought to be preceded by a thorough study of the nation’s past, character, 
work and needs, as well as the careful cultivation of jurisprudence; even 
language must be prepared for this task. Every statute carries a risk of 
interrupting the development of living law, of petrifying it. A codifica-
tion that would not suit completely the nation’s sense of law or would be 
simply premature could do irreparable harm to society. 
It is easy to notice the affinities between this view and the general 
trend of romanticism, which is well illustrated by a portrait of Savigny, 
drawn by Miss Claude (as early as in 1826) in a very romantic manner. 
A beautiful face lost in thought, eyes looking into the distance, hair fall-
ing down in soft curls, a cloak casually draped around shoulders – all 
this speaks volumes about the times… This view prevailed: uniform 
civil law for Germany came to pass almost one hundred years later. 
Since then, however, supporters and opponents of codification have 
been returning to the ideas set out in essays by Thibaut and Savigny. 
How did people envision the question of international law codifi-
cation? We ignore a draft of the “Declaration of the Law of Nations” 
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(or rather states) submitted to the Convent by deputy Fr. Grégoire (1795); 
it began with a statement that “peoples (or rather states) remain with 
respect to one another in a natural state joined by the ties of universal 
morality” followed by 21 articles formulating not so much the interna-
tional law norms in force as the postulates of revolutionary philosophy. 
It never went beyond the drafting stage. 
The necessity of codifying the law of nations was mentioned first, 
I think, by Jeremy Bentham, who saw it as a road to permanent peace. 
In his ideas, however, the great Utilitarian turned out to be a utopian. 
The formulas included in von Traitteur-Luzberg’s Skizze zu einem Völk-
ergesetzbuche (1814), which seem to be of little value, were dissected 
in a book by Zenon Przesmycki, to which I shall return. The first draft 
of a code of international law, comprising 414 articles, was published 
by a Spaniard, de Ferrater, in 1846; an Italian, Paroldo, followed in his 
footsteps in 1851. The declarations made by Garden (1852) were never 
fulfilled, while works by Weiss (1854 & 1858) are codes of neutral-
ity law and maritime law in name only. Only in 1861 did the Austrian 
jurist von Domin-Petrushevecz publish Précis  d’un  code  de  droit  in-
ternational, a critical and thorough compilation—though not free from 
mistakes—of formulas in which he captured positive international law, 
both public and private.
The Instructions  for  the government of armies of  the United States 
in  the field drafted by Francis Lieber in 1863, were different in nature, 
codifying the rules of land warfare in 157 sections. The Instructions 
was commissioned by the US government for the use by the Union Army 
in the Civil War. The work by the outstanding scholar paved the way that 
led to—via Brussels and Oxford attempts—to The Hague Rules of Land 
Warfare of 1897. Lieber was followed by Bluntschli, who in 1868 pub-
lished a work entitled Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisirten Staaten 
als Rechtsbuch dargestellt. Over-praised and translated into over a dozen 
languages, this work, later subjected to critical dissection, turned out to be 
weaker than expected. Next to its undeniable advantages, among which 
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the great erudition and broad horizons of its author must be mentioned 
first, we find in it not only serious drafting mistakes but also major short-
comings in the system, internal contradictions and, finally, a confusion of 
the author’s personal views with the objectively existing norms pertaining 
to international law. Nevertheless, Bluntschli’s work, made a great contri-
bution to the popularisation of the law of nations, unmatched by the works 
attempting to advance codification written by his successors. Their num-
ber is quite considerable. Dudley Field (1872), Fiore (1890), Duplessix 
(1906), Internoscia (1910), the former president of Brazil, Epitacio Pessoa 
(1911), not counting the authors of incomplete or partial attempts, such 
as Farnese (1873) and others. Their codification attempts had one trait 
in common—perhaps with the exception of that by von Domin-Petrush-
evecz—their aspiration was not to codify precisely existing positive inter-
national law, but rather to supplement it; to create new law in agreement 
with their views and preferences. Hence, they could be called philanthro-
pists in the meaning given to this word in the 18th century: friends of 
humanity (amis de l’Humanité). 
A Polish jurist will find with justified contentment that, among the 
few works on the subject, an extensive dissertation written by Pole—
though in Russian—came out as early as in 1886, which addressed the 
history and provided a critical analysis of codification attempts in inter-
national law. The Polish character of the work can be detected in the first 
place in the way its author discusses issues, and in the direction he 
searches for answers to questions posed; the reader senses, knows, that 
the author is thinking all the time of the Polish question in international 
law. The juvenile author, Zenon Przesmycki, was awarded the Warsza-
wa University Gold Medal for this dissertation. Certainly, few know to-
day that Miriam (Przesmycki’s pen name) began his writing career with 
a juristic dissertation, having studied international law. Only later did he 
become a prince of Polish poets and make unforgettable contributions to 
Polish culture. He covered the same road as the great Grotius but in the 
opposite direction, for the latter began his amazing writing career that 
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earned him the name of the Father of international law with a volume 
of poetry. 
More fruitful than individual efforts, the work of the Institute of In-
ternational Law has continued now for almost six decades. 
As early as 1855, Prof. Kaufmann from Bonn published a work en-
titled Die Idee und der praktische Nutzen einer Weltakademie des Völker-
rechts. Ten years later, this idea was taken up by the well-known Belgian 
jurist Rolin-Jaequemyns, but only in 1871 did Francis Lieber, already 
mentioned earlier, write him a letter in which he recognised the advan-
tages of regular congresses of international law scholars; congresses that 
would be independent of governments and purely academic. Their pur-
pose would be to prepare the partial and gradual codification of the law 
of nations. Now, backed by Lieber’s authority, encouraged by the Swiss 
Moynier, Rolin-Jaequemyns was in the position to approach over a doz-
en of the most eminent international-law scholars with specific propos-
als. In September 1873, in one of the halls of the historical Ghent City 
Hall, in the presence of almost twenty participants, the Institute of In-
ternational Law was founded and immediately set out to study system-
atically selected questions of our discipline. The founding of the Institute 
was welcomed by international law scholars as a historical event of great 
importance. The founder of the Italian School in international law studies, 
Stanislao Mancini, greeted the founding of the Institute in a lecture with 
a title similar to one von Savigny delivered many years earlier: Vocazione 
del nostro secolo per la codificazione e la riforma del diritto delle genti. 
Realising that the study of international law required a lot of time 
and that any ideas regarding codification called for extreme caution, 
the Institute has always exercised praiseworthy prudence in embarking 
on the study of selected questions of the law of nations. In the several 
dozen volumes of its yearbooks, there are invaluable materials for the 
codification of international law, both public and private. 
Besides this Institute, the American Institute of International Law 
has been active for over ten years. I shall return to it in a moment. 
268 | Bohdan Winiarski
Founded in 1919, Union  juridique  internationale was not viable. The 
unification of maritime law, though for the most part private, was greatly 
helped by the Maritime Committee in Antwerp. Interest in the issues of 
international law and its codification is stimulated widely by the Interna-
tional Law Association, which was founded in 1873 as the Association 
for the Reform and Codification of International Law and remains under 
British influence. Similar but less effective efforts are undertaken by the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union (since 1889), League of Nations Union and 
finally diverse pacifist organisations. 
Finally, it must be observed that research into international law that 
has been flourishing for several decades now also paves the way for 
steps towards its codification. 
How do official attempts undertaken so far look? Since almost the 
first day of its existence, the Institute of International Law has focused its 
studies on the questions of peaceful settlement of international disputes, 
and extradition. A convention on the former question was not signed un-
til the Peace Conference in The Hague in 1899, before it was expanded 
and supplemented at a second conference in 1907. The convention is 
largely a record of the customary law that had developed in this field, 
but it does list certain innovations as well (special mediation or interna-
tional commissions of inquiry). After the war, the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration was set up at The Hague and conciliatory proceedings have 
been widely adopted. However, various countries are parties to various 
conventions; even The Hague arbitration procedure is only auxiliary in 
nature. Is it possible to speak in this respect of codification at all? As 
regards extradition, which has been regulated by countries from time 
immemorial through numerous—and as a rule—boilerplate bilateral 
agreements, it has been recently assessed as … not ripe for codification 
by a League of Nations commission. 
In 1880, the Institute, encouraged by the success of Lieber’s In-
structions and not discouraged by the failure of the Brussels Conference 
in 1874, embarked on the codification of the laws of land warfare that 
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only came to be written down in the form of a convention in 1899 (the 
so-called Hague Rules) and subsequently revised in 1907. Curiously 
enough, there are countries that have not adopted the Rules; there are 
certainly others that have acceded to the 1899 Convention but not to the 
revised Convention of 1907, while the Convention is applicable only if 
all belligerent states are parties to it, or else customary law comes into 
play. The “codification” of the laws of sea warfare (the London Declara-
tion of 1909) has never ripened into an agreement. 
The rules of navigation on rivers dividing or crossing two or more 
countries laid down in Articles 108–116 of the Final Act of the Vienna 
Congress have been the subject of many later agreements that by no means 
always followed the 1815 Treaty. The Final Act was followed by oth-
ers in 1856 (Danube) and 1885 (Congo and Niger); the Institute took on 
this question in 1883. The Versailles Treaty brought further provisions in 
this respect and only in 1921, at the Barcelona Conference, was the Bar-
celona Convention and Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways 
of International Concern  adopted, which was meant above all to be the 
codification of norms applicable to these questions. The Convention has 
introduced many worrying innovations such as provisions on river works 
and river administration; it has not been ratified by many countries of 
prime significance for international navigation. Finally, yet importantly, 
the Convention, similarly to others, has not supplanted customary law, 
thus it is not an instance of codification in the proper meaning of this word. 
Similarly, one can speak of Hague conventions on private interna-
tional law as codifications, but only with some reservation. The same 
is true for Brussels conventions on maritime law. 
America seems to be moving at a faster pace along this path, however. 
Since 1826, when the first congress of a number of American re-
publics, which had been convened in Panama on the initiative of the 
great Bolivar, resolved in favour of the codification of the international 
law they had adopted, the idea of codification has enjoyed sustained 
popularity. The codification of private international law was the purpose 
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of congresses in Lima (1877) and Montevideo (1888). A major prepa-
ratory step in this direction was taken by Pan-American conferences 
(1st, Washington 1889, 2nd, Mexico 1901, 3rd, Rio de Janeiro 1906, 
4th, Buenos Aires 1910, 5th, Santiago 1923, 6th, Havana 1928). Imple-
menting the resolutions of the 3rd Conference, a congress of American 
jurists gathered in Rio de Janeiro in 1912. It is to this congress that 
we owe the draft codes of public (Pessoa) and private (Pereira) inter-
national law. The 5th Conference approached the task from a different 
angle: having given up on complete codification, it resolved to strive for 
a partial and gradual one. The prime mover behind these efforts is the re-
nowned Chilean jurist Alejandro Alvarez, residing mainly in Paris. The 
American Institute of International Law adopted 30 draft conventions 
that covered almost all public international law (Lima 1924) and dis-
cussed a draft code of private international law, drawn up by the excel-
lent Cuban jurist de Bustamante (Montevideo, 1927). The new congress 
of American jurists (Rio de Janeiro, 1927) approved 12 draft conven-
tions concerning public international law and the draft of an overall con-
vention, covering all private international law. Curiously enough, the 
word “codification” is not used there; instead, it has been replaced by 
the “development” of international law. The 6th Pan-American Confer-
ence adopted seven agreements, concerning public international law and 
de Bustamante’s code of private international law. The American efforts 
at codification are accompanied by enthusiasm and optimism unknown 
elsewhere. True, it is all about particularly American law and the repub-
lics of the New World are not divided by so many and such deep differ-
ences as the countries of Europe are. But again, on the Old Continent, 
worries are expressed that this American impetus, ignoring the state of 
other parts of the world, will hamper, if not prevent, the work on bring-
ing international law to universal unity…
Supposedly, this last task is to be given to the League of Nations, 
which is repeatedly accused of delaying tactics by the enthusiasts of 
quick and complete codification of the law of nations. 
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When, in the summer of 1920, the committee of ten jurists was draft-
ing the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, it had to 
allow for the imperfect state our branch of law was in. For this reason, it 
adopted a resolution on 21 July in which it argued that security called for 
extending the rule of the law of nations to new domains and advancing 
further the international judiciary, which was hampered in its develop-
ment by the imperfections of the law. Hence, the committee proposed 
that, following the pattern set by the first two Hague conferences, peri-
odic conferences be held in The Hague pour l’avancement du droit in-
ternational. The proposition was not acceded to by the 1st Assembly of 
the League. However, already in 1924, the Swedish delegate to the 5th 
Assembly proposed a motion to draft conventions in matters in which 
states, recognising fundamental legal norms, differ in their interpretation 
and application, and, if possible, in matters that had not been regulated 
at all by the law of nations until then. Since then, the matter of interna-
tional law codification was on the agenda of the League. A committee 
of experts was appointed that in four annual sessions (1925–1928) and 
during intervals between the sessions prepared materials for the future 
conference. The committee, following the example set by other consul-
tative bodies of the League, addressed governments twice: for the first 
time to learn about their views on the questions and methods of codifica-
tion in general and find out what their stance was on a number of issues 
with regard to which codification appeared desirable and feasible. For 
the second time, the committee addressed governments after it had se-
lected three issues to be discussed at a future conference. By sending out 
questionnaires, it intended to collect information on the views the states 
had on the legal status of these issues, the state of international practice 
and, finally, ideas and postulates of the states regarding these issues.2 
2 The work and methods of the commission of experts are discussed at length in the article 
by S. Rundstein, member of the commission on behalf of the Polish Government. S. Rund-
stein, Kodyfikacja prawa międzynarodowego, “Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjolog-
iczny” 1928, vol. 1.
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The selected issues cover citizenship, territorial waters and the re-
sponsibility of a state for damage done to foreigners and their prop-
erty on its territory. The materials collected for the use of a conference 
(mainly government replies to the questionnaires) make up three bulky 
volumes. 
The 9th Assembly of the League (1928), being very cautious in making 
plans for the immediate future, adopted a resolution nonetheless in which 
it expressed the wish that the Council would appoint a committee of three 
jurists to draw up a list of all international law issues suitable for codifica-
tion without predetermining the order in which they were to be worked 
on. The Assembly also expressed that these same jurists would explore 
the possibility of publishing existing general conventions (i.e. open for all 
states) in the form of a code or rather a corpus juris systematically organ-
ised and kept à jour. This was done and the 10th Assembly of the League 
(1929); having taken cognizance of the list of issues suitable for codifica-
tion, it expressed the wish that the commission of experts should continue 
their work after a future conference. Furthermore, the Assembly, approv-
ing the opinion of the three jurists that a systematic publication of general 
conventions in the form of a corpus juris would not be possible now, found 
it to be beneficial to determine the texts of agreements concluded by vari-
ous states on certain matters and specify which states were bound by these 
agreements. Thus, the League did not swerve from the course it had tak-
en and along which it intends to proceed slowly and cautiously as before. 
4. The second Hague Conference ended its proceedings with a reso-
lution that after a certain time, similar to the period that had lapsed be-
tween the first and the second Conference (1899–1907), the third Con-
ference would be convened, preceded by long and thorough prepara-
tions, involving matters suitable for international regulation in the near 
future (susceptibles d’un prochain règlement  international). The term 
“codification” was not used there and probably rightly so, because it 
would have to mean something else with respect to international law 
and domestic law. Indeed, this is about very different things. First, the 
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issue concerns writing down in the form of an agreement the custom-
ary law in force, which in domestic relations has always been treated 
as only one of preparatory works for codification. Next, the aim might 
be to supplant many bilateral agreements on a certain subject with 
a single general multilateral agreement. This is sometimes necessary 
for practical reasons and technically possible if general rules embodied 
in analogous provisions can be derived from a multitude of bilateral 
agreements: the Universal Postal Convention or the Berne Convention 
concerning the Carriage of Goods by Rail attest that such a manner of 
proceeding serves the purpose. But then again, the example of the Bar-
celona Convention or the abandoning of the general extradition conven-
tion shows that a general convention does not always mean progress. 
Finally, the purpose is often not to compile the existing rules in force in 
an agreement, but rather to introduce new things, often contravening the 
law in force, that is to say, to “reform” international law. The mere com-
pilation of customary law norms in an agreement could not be achieved 
without negotiating them, that is, without making some changes: delet-
ing some norms and introducing others. As long as this concerns subor-
dinate norms of, let say, an organisational, technical or executive nature, 
the matter may not raise any doubts; but what about more fundamental 
norms that touch the foundations of international law?
In this connection, supporters of “codification” indicate the advan-
tages of establishing what the law is. The certainty of legal norms is 
indeed a serious argument for written law; the necessity of removing 
ambiguities, differences or contradictions follows naturally from the 
legal ordering imposed by an agreement. However, these advantages 
are not absolute. Experience shows that states often refuse to accede to 
a convention, disapproving of the approach it takes and the technical 
implementation of the principles that they by no means question. Pil-
let, the the old Paris Professor, had earlier noted the danger threatening 
the entire convention when one of its clauses is breached. In customary 
law, there is no such relationship. Finally, one should not disregard the 
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consideration that although the principle pacta sunt servanda is a foun-
dation of international law, customary law as a rule enjoys greater es-
teem than conventional one. 
Admittedly, conventional law is easier to learn about, and it is more 
accessible for the general public than customary law. Besides, conven-
tional law makes the task of international courts of arbitration easier. 
However, it must not be forgotten that law having an agreement as its 
source may be abolished by conflicting customary law. 
One can hardly agree with the excellent Belgian jurist de Visscher, 
who claims that written law gives smaller and weaker states greater guar-
antees than customary law. After all, international law is an outcome of 
clashes between different senses of law of various nations, their different 
ethical views and conflicting interests. However the forces at play here are 
distributed, as it were, in time and space; ultimately, those norms remain 
that best suit the needs of all members of the international community. 
Those who have taken part in concluding great international agreements 
know what a great role the pressure of great powers plays on such occa-
sions, the more so as it is concentrated in time and space. They ruthlessly 
pursue their political and economic goals. On other occasions, pressure 
comes from the public opinion stirred by agitation; let’s say, from the 
organised and more active segment of the general public, for instance 
pacifist societies. Do I have to remind you of the revolutionary appeal 
made by Lord Robert Cecil from the rostrum of the League of Nations 
to “working-class and peasant masses” concerning disarmament? Fur-
thermore, pressure is exerted by League agendas, including its Secretariat 
itself at times; when the text of a convention is adopted by a majority of 
votes, do I need to remind you of the relentless pressure brought to bear 
by the League on the states to ratify the convention that does not suit 
them? Frequently, pressure comes from the highest international finan-
cial circles, secret societies, the press doing their bidding, and finally the 
pursuit of popularity or even electoral considerations at home play a part. 
Therefore, the value of international agreements as the source of law by 
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no means grows in proportion to their constantly growing number and the 
ease with which they are concluded now, owing to the technical and or-
ganisational assistance of the League of Nations. Sometimes, the legal 
value of today’s agreements makes one long for the quality of, let’s say, 
the Hague conventions. 
Usually, a distinction is made between lawmaking agreements, being 
a source of international law (the Germans call them Vereinbarung), and 
contracts representing ordinary transactions between states (Vertrag). 
Sometimes, in a brutal play of interests, the distinction is obliterated, 
which by no means adds moral authority to lawmaking agreements. Un-
der these conditions, it must be considered exceedingly dangerous to 
try—as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to approve—to “preclude 
the imposition of any time limits on agreements and the possibility of 
their termination … to make agreement-based norms override agree-
ments … A norm overriding the fluctuations of the will of the parties is 
the objective of the League of Nations, wishing it to be a characteristic 
feature of lawmaking conventions”.3 There is a fear that the codification 
of international law may be used for political ends. 
Not only states may bring “politics” to “codification”. This can be 
done—and is done quite openly—by international movements and or-
ganisations working towards the fundamental “reform” of the law of 
nations. They take every opportunity to try to undermine the “fetish 
of sovereignty”; in closing legal “loopholes” and extending interna-
tional regulations to domains hitherto not covered by them, they see 
a means to restrict the domestic jurisdiction of the state. Frequently, they 
consider this exclusive jurisdiction as the range of activity “conceded” 
or “delegated” to states by the international community. They push for 
obliterating borders, eliminating differences between states and impos-
ing universal unification. In opposition to the state as a subject of inter-
national law, they put forward the individual and class. They impose an 
3 S. Rundstein, Kodyfikacja  prawa  międzynarodowego, “Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny 
i Socjologiczny” 1928, z. 1.
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obligatory judiciary, regardless of the consent of the parties, demand that 
particular states disarm but also that penal measures and an international 
executive be introduced. Behind this agenda lies the idea of a “super-
state” and single government that would be so powerful that nobody can 
or dare resist it. This would be the end of international “anarchy” but 
also the end of independent nations and the end of states, which would 
be reduced to the markings of territorial divisions. This would be the 
end of international law as well. 
Both the countries that impose their interests and the international 
movements or organisations that impose their conceptions… and surely 
interests as well, know what they want, what their objectives are and are 
capable of realising their plans step by step with admirable determination 
and enviable persistence. The situation is worse for those countries that 
do not have a guideline, are incapable of consistency in their actions, or 
ca not muster up persistence in their aspirations. Great Britain is a paragon 
in this respect. After all, any action ought to be based on this assumption: 
know international law and have some policy on international law. 
Bringing order to international law may and should be supported in 
the areas where this is needed and feasible. I do not see any harm in this, 
if this is called the “partial and gradual codification” of international 
law. Caution and absence of haste are crucial: after all, it is not only 
about the sense of law that nations have and that cannot be violated, 
not only about interests, but many a time about the very existence of 
a country. Instructions given in this spirit by the US government to its 
delegation to the 2nd Hague Conference are full of wisdom. It is neces-
sary to choose carefully the matters for codification conventions and 
give up total codification, following a plan set in advance. Moreover, 
we should stick to practical, concrete matters without going into funda-
mental questions. In every detail, however, we should bear in mind the 
fundamental principles of the law of nations. For this reason a conven-
tion on the “fundamental rights and duties of states” would be danger-
ous, although the “Declaration on Rights and Duties of States” adopted 
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by the American Institute of International Law in 1916, is very useful, 
representing a warning, steeped in the spirit of freedom, against univer-
salist, cosmopolitan and anti-state tendencies. 
One of the authors of the Napoleonic Code, Portalis, said: Les codes 
des peuples se font avec le temps, mais, à proprement parler, on ne les 
fait pas. The same is true, a fortiori, about international law. When an 
outstanding legal scholar, Th. Niemeyer, was writing three years ago 
Vom Beruf unserer Zeit zur Kodifikation des Völkerrechts, he asked him-
self two questions: Is the matter ripe enough for codification? and, Are 
our times capable of performing this codification task well? His answers 
demanded rather… prudence. Another German international law schol-
ar, K. Strupp, remembering the discussions held in the Institute of In-
ternational Law 50 years ago said in 1929, not without melancholy, that 
heute wie vor fünfzig Jahren die Methode der Kodifikation noch immer 
höchst unvollkommen ist. 
For a long time Poland did not participate in the shaping of interna-
tional law, which had once developed with her commendable partici-
pation. Now, when she stands again among nations equal to all others, 
she has not only a right but also a duty to be present and active in all the 
places where international law is forged in a bitter struggle or a peaceful 
debate. Not only because she has the right to demand that the develop-
ing norms of international law not infringe her interests and not insult 
her sense of law, but also because in her millennium-old tradition of 
international relations, in her legal culture and political thought, she has 
high moral and legal values that she is obliged to contribute to the com-
mon treasure trove of the law of nations. This is Poland’s duty to herself 
and the international community. 
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